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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE PLRA:
INMATES AS "OUTSIDERS" AND THE
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY
JAMES E. ROBERTSON"
"Uludicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates-not to mention
considerations of basic humanity-are to be observed in the prisons. t I
"[The federal courts are] havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer be-
cause they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming vic-
tims of prejudice and public excitement. n
2
I. INTRODUCTION
In Harris v. Fleming, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
spoke for many federal courts when it observed that "U] udges
are not wardens, but we must act as wardens to the limited ex-
tent that unconstitutional prison conditions force us to intervene
when those responsible for the conditions have failed to act."'
This admission is revealing of judicial perception and motive:
rather than characterizing its actions as discretionary, the court
asserted that it had no choice but to join the fray.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA)5 partly in response to the judicial philosophy expressed
in Harris. Rather than defining judicial intervention as a
"force[d]" response to neglectful prison staff, congressional
* Distinguished Professor of Correctional Law, Minnesota State University,
Mankato (james.robertson@mnsu.edu). This Article is an expanded version of a paper
presented at the Harvard Law School on March 10, 2001, as part of the conference
"Blocking the Courthouse Doors: Contemporary Congressional Limits on Federal Ju-
risdiction."
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981) (Brennan,J., concurring).
'Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
Harris v. Flemming, 839 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1235 (emphasis added).
Pub. L. No. 104-134 (April 16, 1996), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
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backers portrayed judges as liberal busybodies giving aid and
comfort to litigious inmates.6 After scant deliberation,7 the
Congress passed and President Clinton signed legislation of far
reaching consequence for courts, corrections, and the Constitu-
tion." The PLRA constrains inmates by requiring them to ex-
haust administrative remedies before bringing suit;9 pay filing
fees;1" and forgo damages for emotional injuries absent a prior
physical injury." While the Act permits the judiciary to sua sponte
dismiss claims failing to state a cause of action,2 its power to
grant prospective relief cannot extend beyond correcting the
right in question;"3 and the relief can be terminated within two
6 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (urging passage to "bring relief to a civil justice system overburdened by frivo-
lous prisoner lawsuits"), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITIGATION
REFORMACT OF 1996, PuB. L. No. 104-134, at doc. 14 (1997) (Bernard D. Reems, Jr. &
William H. Manz eds., 1997) [hereinafter 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON
LmGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996]; 141 CONG. REC. S14419 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995)(statement of Sen. Abraham) (heralding the proposed legislation as a bar to judicial
intervention "for the slightest reason"), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM AcT OF 1996, supra at doc. 15; United States v. Simmonds,
111 F.3d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The main purpose of the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act was to curtail abusive prison-condition litigation."); Hampton Hobbs, 106
F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The legislation was aimed at the skyrocketing num-
bers of claims filed by prisoners-many of which are meritless-and the correspond-
ing burden those filings have place on the federal courts."); Santana v. United States,
98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Congress enacted the PLRA primarily to curtail
claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Torts Claims Act,
most of which concern prison conditions and many of which are routinely dismissed
as legally frivolous.").
7 See 142 CONG. REc. S2296 (daily ed. March 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM AcT OF
1996, supra note 6, at doc. 23 (stating that "the PLRA was the subject of a single hear-
ing in the Judiciary Committee, hardly the type of thorough review that a measure of
this scope deserves"); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)("[I]t is worth noting that some believe that this legislation which has a far-reaching
effect on prison conditions and prisons' rights deserved to have been the subject of
significant debate. It was not.").
8 On April 24, 1996, the House of Representatives and the Senate approved of the
Act by a vote of 399 to 25 and 89 to 11, respectively. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, supra note 6, at viii.
' See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (West Supp. 2000).
"See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1914(a) (West Supp. 2000).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (West Supp. 2000).
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii) (West Supp. 2000).
" 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a) (1) (West Supp. 2000).
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years or, in some instances, sooner.'4 In addition, the Act caps
fees for attorneys' 5 and special masters.16
Despite the growing literature about this profoundly impor-
tant legislation,"f the jurisprudence of the PLRA remains un-
studied. This Article locates the PLRA amid the long-running
debate over the interpretative authority of Article III courts.
The federal judiciary has experienced a crisis of legitimacy since
Alexander Bickel labeled it a "deviant institution" because of its
capacity to frustrate majority will.'" This Article contends that
"See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b) (1) (West Supp. 2000).
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(d) (West Supp. 2000).
"See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) (2) (West Supp. 2000).
A small slice of PLRA commentary includes: Thomas Julian Butler, The Prison
Litigation Reform Act: A Separation of Powers Dilemma, 50 ALA. L. REv. 585 (1999);Joseph
T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You're Out of Court-It May
Be Effective, but is it Constitutional?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 471 (1997); Jason E. Pepe, Chal-
lenging Congress's Latest Attempt to Confine Prisoners' Constitutional Rights: Equal Protection
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 23 HAMLINE L. REv. 59 (1999);James E. Robertson,
Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A "Not Exactly" Equal Protection
Analysis, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 105 (2000) [hereinafter Robertson, Psychological Injury
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act]; James E. Robertson, Prison Reform, A Faustian Bar-
gain: Commentary on Prospective Relief Before and After Miller v. French, 37 CRIM. L.
BULLETIN 195 (2001); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws:
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997); Peter Hobart, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform
Act: Striking the Balance Between Law and Order, 44 VILL. L. REV. 981 (1999); Eugene J.
Kuzinski, Note, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous Inmate Litigation, Judicial Over-
sight, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361 (1998); Stacey
Heather O'Bryan, Note, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Impact of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement on the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1189 (1997); Catherine G. Patsos, Note, The Constitutionality and Implications of the
Prison Litigation Reform Ac 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 205 (1998); Julie M. Riewe, Note,
The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes In Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J. 117 (1997).
'8 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1978); cf Barry Fried-
man, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 578 (1993) ("At least since
Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch, constitutional scholars have been pre-
occupied, indeed one might say obsessed, by the perceived necessity of legitimating
judicial review.") (footnotes omitted). Many scholars have embraced Bickel's con-
cerns as legitimate but have disagreed about the degree to which courts are counter-
majoritarian. See, e.g., ROBERT H. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 190 (1989)
(concluding that "a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court are never out of
line for very long with the views . . . among the lawmaking majorities"); ROBERT
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (1960) (arguing that one would have
difficulty in finding "a single historical instance when the Court has stood firm for
very long against ... public demand"); Friedman, supra, at 587-616 (questioning 'just
how 'countermajoritarian' courts are"; delimiting process majoritarianism from sub-
stance majoritarianism; and concluding that "it becomes difficult to identify a 'major-
ity' whose will courts are trumping"); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as National Policy-Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (asserting that
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the PLRA represents the assertion of majoritarian supremacy
over constitutional courts accused of exceeding their legitimate,
limited authority.'9
The Article proceeds in the following manner. The follow-
ing section describes the collision between two models, one di-
rected at prison reform and the other dominating constitutional
law. From the majoritarian perspective, prison reform judges
fell victim to "Lochnerization:,20 they engaged in judicial policy
making in the name of adjudication. By enacting the PLRA,
Congress sought to forbid judicial overreaching.
The Article next questions whether inmates can secure ade-
quate constitutional protection from abusive penal practices.
*The answer reveals that prisoners' rights advocates are cor-
nered: the PLRA limits the remedial powers of federal courts;21
and, in deference to majoritarian supremacy, the judiciary has
rejected challenges to its constitutionality. 22
I conclude by positing a 'justice gap" between underlying
constitutional norms and the case law providing for a piecemeal
prisoners' bill of rights. This Article shows that the cornerstone
of prisoners' rights-the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment 2S -embodies underenforced
constitutional norms. Moreover, its content reveals an inclu-
siveness sadly absent from the majoritarian paradigm of consti-
tutional law.
the Court is "never for long out of line with ... lawmaking majorities"). On the other
hand, the elected branches often do not mirror the will of the majority. See, e.g., Alan
D. Monroe, Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 6, 15-16
(1998) (finding that congressional action and public opinion achieved concurrence
fifty-five percent of the time between 1980-1993).
9 See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (describing the principal proposi-
tions of majoritarian supremacy).
2' The term "Lochnerization" is derived from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45(1905), and denotes a priori reasoning. In Lochner, the Supreme Court found "a gen-
eral right ... to contract." Id. at 58. Lochner's offspring read laissez faire values into
the Constitution. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923) (rul-
ing that minimum wage laws violated due process); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 25-
26 (1915) (striking down legislation prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts); see also text
accompanying infra note 35 (describing the "Lochner era").
21 See supra notes 11, 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing the PLRA's provi-
sions addressing damages and prospective relief).
' See infra note 57 (citing cases).
" U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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II. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN
DIFFICULTY
In the decade preceding the PLRA, many federal judges be-
came managers of systemic prison reforms and thus oversaw di-
rectly, or through special masters, the day-to-day operations of
21
correctional institutions. In some instances, a federal district
judge effectively took control of a state's entire prison system.2
5
Feeley and Rubin characterized "the massive intervention into
state corrections . . . [as] the most striking example of judicial
policy making" in modern America. Moreover, they con-
cluded that judicially engineered prison reform "violated nearly
every accepted principle for controlling the judicial branch."
This manner of prison reform directly confronted what
Bickel famously called the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"2s -
that democracy means majority rule and the power of the
24 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376, 376-77 (1982) (de-
scribing a "more active, 'managerial' stance" among judges, leading them to "meet[]
with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of disputes and to supervise case
preparation"); see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (defining the role of the trial judge as "the creator
and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief"); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Politi-
cal Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43,
46 (1979) (defining the role of the trial judge as a "political powerbroker"); cf Spe-
cial Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
784, 790-853 (1978) (providing a generic, in-depth description of institutional reform
adjudication). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and Ex-
traordinay in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467 (1980) (contending
that institutional reform adjudication had much in common with traditional litiga-
tion but for the "undreamed-of entitlements" it dispensed) (footnote omitted).
5 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1297-402 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified,
650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir.),
modified, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (ordering system-wide relief in Texas); New-
man v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 289-90 286 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Ala-
bama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (ordering system-wide relief in Alabama);
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 986-89 (D.R.I. 1977), remanded to 599 F.2d 17
(1st Cir. 1979), affd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1979) (ordering system-wide relief in
Puerto Rico); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 382-85 E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971) (ordering system-wide relief in Arkansas).
2 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 13-14 (1998).
'7 Id. at 18.
" BICKEL, supra note 18, at 16.
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federal judiciary to impede majority rule renders judicial review
a "deviant institution."2 Majoritarians posit a distinction be-
tween law and policy; they envisage a minimal, deferential role
for the courts, with judges reading the open-ended provisions of
the Constitution in light of majority opinion and the policy
preferences of the elected branches of government.30
The Framers of the Constitution did not share Bickel's con-
cerns. They distrusted majority rule" and embraced natural
rights. Their notion of democracy rested on the Lockean indi-
vidual rather than the collective good. 2 "To Locke," wrote one
29 Id. at 27. The pervasive suspicion of judicial review finds expression in what is
perhaps the most important contribution to constitutional scholarship of the past
fifty years, John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust. In one revealing passage, Ely seam-
lessly quotes Bickel and, in so doing, bows to the majoritarian paradigm:
[M]ost of the important policy decisions are made by our elected representatives (or by
people accountable to them) .... Judges, at least federal judges-while they obviously are
not entirely oblivious to popular opinion -are not elected or reelected. "[Nlothing can fi-
nally depreciate the central function that is assigned in democratic theory and practice to
the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the policy-making power of representative
institutions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system.
Judicial review works counter to this characteristic."
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 (1982) (quoting BICKEL, supra note 18, at
19).
" See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting)("[I] n a democracy the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic stan-
dards of decency prevailing in society."); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730(1963) ("We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do
not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies,
who are elected to pass laws.").
" See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 129-30 (Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright,
ed., 1961) (observing that "measures are too often decided, not according to the
rules of Justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an in-
terested and overbearing majority"); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376(1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring) (arguing that judicial review existed to prevent "the
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities"); H.N. HIRSCH, A THEORY OF LIBERTY 5(1992) ("Properly understood, American constitutionalism is meant to be counterma-
joritarian.");Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1503, 1522(1990) ("If the Constitution's Framers were keen on majority rule, they certainly had
a bizarre manner of demonstrating their affection."); Robertson, Psychological Injury
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, supra note 17, at 122 ("The Framers intended the
textually specific components of the constitutional system-the Bill of Rights, repub-
licanism, federalism, and the separation of powers-to both guarantee and limit ma-
jority rule.") (footnotes omitted).
" See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 531, 531 (1998) (" [H] istory suggests that representation in America was de-
signed not as a means for the people to participate in government, but as a means for
the people to protect themselves from their own representative government."); Chris
Hutton, Reason and Passion: A Review of Morton Horowitz' The Warren Court and the Pur-
PLRAJURJSPRUDENCE
commentator, "the law is an institutional device that connects
the different perspectives of individuals by harmonizing the natural
rights that they equally enjoy. '
'1
3
Long before Bickel's time, however, majoritarian supremacy
became equated with democracy. 4 A constitutional sea change
had occurred in 1937 with the passing of the so-called Lochner
era:
The Lochner era, a period of Supreme Court jurisprudence spanning
from 1899 to 1937, has long been inscribed into constitutional legend.
The legend characterizes the Lochner era as one of the darkest chapters
in the saga of constitutional jurisprudence .... During this time, the
Court struck down numerous progressive laws involving economic and
social welfare. ... The Lochner era ended abruptly in 1937 when the• " . 35
Court began consistently to uphold New Deal legislation.
The elevation of Felix Frankfurter from New Deal adviser to
Associate Justice symbolized the constitutional dominance of
majoritarianism in the post-1937 constitutional order.36  He
spoke on behalf of majoritarian supremacy when he announced
from the bench that "[c]ourts are not representative bodies.
They are not designed to be a good reflection of a democratic
society . . . .We are to set aside the judgment of those whose
duty it is to legislate only if there is no reasonable basis for it
.... Law could be purposive but only at the majority's behest.
suit ofJustice, 44 S.D. L. REV. 466, 468 (1999) ("[T]o the Framers of the Constitution,
democracy was a negative-the right to be free from government interference in cer-
tain respects.") (footnote omitted).
33 Ulrich K. Preu, Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges: Liberalism, Re-
publicanism, and Constitutionalism: Communicative Power and the Concept of Law, 17
CARDozo L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1996) (emphasis added).
" See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: The Vanishing Constitution,
103 HARv. L. REV. 43, 64 (1989) (describing "the dominance of majoritarianism" after
1937). That dominance continues. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 590-91 ("The en-
tire pattern of judicial interpretation of constitutional rights is woven into a fabric of
deference to the will of ostensibly more majoritarian branches.") (footnotes omitted).
" DanielJ. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights,
84 IOwAL. REV. 941,949-50 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
36 Cf Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term: The Constitution of Change:
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 32, 62-63 (1993) (ob-
serving that "New Deal ideologues narrowly and mechanically defined democracy
simply to entail majority rule").
" Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
cf Brown, supra note 32, at 552 ("Proponents of the majoritarian paradigm . .. be-
lie [ve] that all public policy must be made according to majority rule .. ").
1932001]
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Deference became the "central principle of judicial review"
in the post-Lochner era.38 When paired with the rational-basis
test, 9 deference stood for the formal separation of law and pol-
icy; and when law and policy met in the real world, deference
meant that functionaries of the emerging administrative state
would not be second-guessed on their policy choices and factual
assessments.
Well into the past century, courts themselves preempted ju-
dicial oversight of prisons by their adherence to the hands-off
doctrine. It represented an early, extreme form of judicial
deference by questioning the competence of courts to grasp
prison administration,4' warning that judicial meddling would
embolden inmates to disrespect and disobey their keepers,42 and
38 See Solove, supra note 35, at 949. Solove defined the "deference principle" as fol-
lows: "that the Court should not attempt to 'second-guess' or 'substitute' its judgment
for the judgment of another decisionmaker or to pass on the 'wisdom' of a policy or
law." Id. at 943.
3' SeeBarels v. Iowa, 255 U.S. 407, 412 (1921) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (internal cita-
tion omitted) ("[T]he only criterion of ... liberty under the Constitution that I can
think of is 'whether, considering the end in view, the statute passes the bounds of
reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat."'). Deference to the
elected branches of government formed the keystone ofJustice Holmes' approach to
judicial restraint:
For a Holmesian, it is up to the legislature and executive to respond to social change and
"the felt necessities of the times," not the courts. Reflecting this fact, virtually all Holmesian
references to a notion of evolving concepts in the Constitution occur in the context of def-
erence to governmental decision.
R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to
Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 199 (1994)
(footnotes omitted).
'0 See, e.g., United States ex rel Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 955 (8th Cir.
1956) (declaring that "it is well settled that it is not the function of the courts to su-
perintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners") (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1950) (positing
that it "is not within the province of the courts to supervise the treatment of prisoners
in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained
there"); United States ex rel Palmer v. Ragen 159 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1947) (ob-
serving that "[u] nder repeated decisions, state governmental bodies, who are charged
with prosecution and punishment of offenders, are not to be interfered with except
in case of extraordinary circumstances") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
" See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CORRECTIONS 18 (1973) ("The courts refused for the most part to intervene.
Judges felt that correctional administration was a technical matter to be left to ex-
perts ... ").
"' See, e.g., Callum v. California Dep't of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 524, 525 (N.D.
Cal. 1967) (warning that "if every time a guard were called upon to maintain order he
2001] PLRAJURISPRUDENCE
positing that federalism shielded state prisons from Article III
courts.
By the late 1960s, however, judges abandoned the hands-off
doctrine in the face of horrific prison conditions and brutal
prison practices. 41 An ever-rising tide of prisoner lawsuits fol-
lowed;4 and the judiciary commenced a transformation "per-
haps second in breadth and detail only to the courts' earlier
role in dismantling segregation in the nation's public schools." 6
While the lower federal courts powered this exercise in ju-
dicial policy making,7 the Supreme Court tried to break its
speed. Just ten years after the collapse of the hands-off doc-
trine, the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish" called for
post-Lochner deference. 9 The Bell Court indicated that restric-
had to consider his possible tort liabilities it might unduly limit his actions"); Golub v.
Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (concluding that "to allow such ac-
tions would be prejudicial to the proper maintenance of discipline").
" See, e.g., United States v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 410, 412 ) (7th Cir. 1963) (stating that
"[ilt is not the function of federal courts to interfere with the conduct of state offi-
cials in carrying out such duties under state law"); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 83 (7th
Cir. 1944) (commenting that the disputes over the management of state prisons "are
questions peculiarly fit to be determined in the first instance by the courts of the
state").
" See, e.g., NORMAN A. CARLSON ET AL., CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1999)
(lamenting that the hands-off doctrine permitted "conditions of squalor and inhu-
mane treatment by correctional personnel and had nowhere to turn for help");
KENNETHJ. PEAK, JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 218 (2d ed. 1998) (observing that "condi-
tions in many prisons were almost insufferable for both staff members and inmates");
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 159 (1967) (declaring that "[l]ife in many
institutions is at best barren and futile, at worst unspeakably brutal and degrading");
MICHAEL WELCH: CORRECTIONS: A CRITICAL APPROACH 356 (1996) (observing that the
hands-off doctrine allowed correctional officials "to operate prisons and jails free
from constraints, even if physical abuse of prisoners was employed to instill discipline
and horrific living conditions persisted in the prison").
" See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS: SELECTED REPORTS AI-55
(1996) (showing that prisoner civil rights filings increased from 218 in 1966 to some
2000 in 1970, and exceeded 39,000 by 1996).
"' Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of Intervention on Prisons and
Jails: A Framework for Analysis and Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND
THE CONSTITUTION 13 (JohnJ. DilulioJr. ed., 1990).
" See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of
Counsel, 17 So. ILL. L. REv. 417, 425 (1993) (stating that lower federal courts decided
"the most important prisoner rights cases") (footnote omitted).
'a441 U.S. 520 (1979).
4' See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 26, at 47 (positing that Bell "presented the
first clear sign" of the Court's role as "a leader in the retrenchment process"); Lisa
Davie Levinson Tenth Circuit Survey: Prisoners' Rights, 75 Deny. U. L. Rev. 1055, 1060
(1998) ("The Court's modern approach to prison litigation began in 1979 [with
Bell] ").
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tions on inmates would survive constitutional challenge merely
by being "reasonably related to the government's interest in
maintaining security and order and operating the institution in
a manageable fashion. 5 °  Moreover, in determining reason-
ableness,judges should defer to prison staff:
[C]ourts must heed our warning that "[s]uch considerations are pecu-
liarly within the province and professional expertise of correctional offi-
cials, and in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate
that officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations,
courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such mat-
ters."
5 1
Notwithstanding pronouncements of a "new" hands-off doc-
trine emerging from the Court, 2 Bell did not prevent institu-
tional reform decrees.5 Indeed, their breadth more than
" Bell, 441 U.S. at 540-41 n.23. For criticism of the Court's policy of deference,
see, for example, Ronald L. Kuby & Wiliam M. Kunstler, Silencing the Oppressed: No
Freedom of Speech for Those Behind the Walls, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1005, 1023 (1993)
("[It is] simply untrue that prison administrators ... possess some mysterious exper-
tise that requires deference from the federal courts. Prison administrators differ
widely in background, education, skills, and social attitudes.").
51 Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
52 See, e.g., Mark Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands-Off
Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REv. 1, 5 (1978) (discerning similar ra-
tionales for the hands-off doctrine and deference). While the Court did not return to
the hands-off doctrine, it did employ deference in ruling after ruling. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 (1996) ("[The] principle of deference has special force with
regard to that issue, since the inmates in lockdown include 'the most dangerous and
violent prisoners in the Arizona prison system,' and other inmates presenting special
disciplinary and security concerns.") (citation omitted); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.
472, 482 (1995) ("[Flederal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexi-
bility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment."); Hudson v. McMil-
lan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) ("'[P]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-
ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security."' (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 (citation omitted)); Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) ("[A] standard [of deference] is necessary if 'prison
administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments con-
cerning institutional operations."' (quotingJones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977) (citation omitted)); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576, 589 (1984) ("'[P]rison administrators are [to be] accorded wide-ranging defer-
ence ... ' (quoting Bell 441 U.S. at 547 (citation omitted)); cf. Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 290, (1983) ("Reviewing courts.., should grant substantial deference to the
broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and lim-
its of punishments for crimes .... ).
53 For instance, Bell appeared to have no significant impact on the decision of the
Fifth Circuit in Ruiz v. Estelle, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), which affirmed the trial
court's ambitious directives for reforming the Texas prison system. Similarly, writing
2001] PLRA JURISPRUDENCE
compensated for the gradual shrinkage of prisoners' substantive
and procedural rights by the Court.' Nor did Bell dampen in-
mates' thirst for litigation.5
In 1996, Congress finished what Bell had begun: by enacting
the PLRA Congress asserted its supremacy over the remedial
16powers of federal courts. The judiciary, in turn, acquiesced byrejecting constitutional challenges to the PLRA.5 7
in 1983, James Jacobs recognized that Bell "failed to prevent major judicial interven-
tions into the operation of state prisons." JAMES B. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 45 (1983).
51 Compare, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. 483-84 (1995) (restricting state-created liberty in-
terests that trigger procedural due process to atypical, significant hardships), with
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476-77 (1983) (defining state-created liberty via sub-
stantive predicates and other mandatory language found in state law); compare, e.g.,
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1987) (ruling that limitations on
inmates' First Amendment rights are acceptable if reasonably related to institutional
goals), with Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974) (holding that censor-
ship of inmate correspondence must advance important and substantial governmen-
tal interests in the least restrictive manner); compare, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 301 n.1, 302 (1991) (ruling that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause con-
tains a state-of-mind requirement), with Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981) (indicating that deprivation of "life's necessities," without regard to state-of-
mind, led to violations of the Eighth Amendment).
" SeeJIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER 58
tbl.3c (1988) (listing civil rights filings, with 11,195 in 1979 as compared to 20,072 in
1986).
In contrast to the rising number of inmate lawsuits after Bell, the PLRA led to a
dramatic decline in filings. See MARIKA F.X. LrrRAs, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 1990-98, 5 (Jan.
2000) (reporting 41,215 filings in 1996, the year Congress enacted the PLRA, and
26,462 in 1998). In turn, many defendants sought termination of prospective reme-
dies. See Paul Elias, Consent Decrees Vanishing Fast, THE RECORDER, Jan. 28,, 1998 avail-
able at LEXIS, Legal News Library ("Since the act's passage, prison officials have filed
a blizzard of motions seeking to get out of consent decrees they entered into years
ago.").
" Inmates have unsuccessfully argued that the Act violates the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and contravenes the separation of powers doc-
trine. Regarding equal protection challenges, see, for example, Tucker v. Branker,
142 F.3d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir.
1997); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 234 (4th Cir. 1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106
F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997); Hanley v. Stewart, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (D.
Ariz. 1998). As to separation of powers challenges, see, for example, Davis v. District
of Columbia 158 F.3d 1342, 1345-47 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459,
463 (7th Cir. 1997); Craig v. Emberly No. 95-M-368, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22949, at
*5-7 (D. Colo. July 27, 1997); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318, 1331 (S.D. Ind.),
affd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997); cf. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall..
. deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws."). The Constitution pro-
vides no "explicit textual reference" to the separation of governmental powers. Wil-
liam C. Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 715, 715 (1984).
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As constitutional "outsiders," replete with their "spoiled
identities,5 8 inmates had nary a voice in the legislative debate
over the proposed legislation. Portrayed as recreational litiga-
tors, suing over bad haircuts and the like, they had become
58 Several commentators have employed the term "outsiders" in referring to in-
mates. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider, 134
U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1293 (1986) ("The inside-outsider is inside the scope of state
power but outside the processes of political participation."); Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing
Compassion Into the Province ofJudging:Justice Blackmun and the Outsiders, 71 N. DAK. L.
REv. 173, 176 (1995) [hereinafter Karlan, Bringing Compassion] (referring to inmates
as "the least sympathetic group of 'outsiders' in our constitutional jurisprudence,
since their banishment from free society is the result of their willful criminal behav-
ior"); James E. Robertson, Four Little Eighteenth-Centuy Words: An Integrated Reading of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 475, 483 (2001) (footnotes
omitted) (on file with author) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment performs its counterma-
joritarian function by safeguarding a specific category of 'people [not] like us'-
'Outsiders'-from denials of equal concern and respect").
As I employ the term, "outsiders" are persons whose character has been so discred-
ited that their identities have been "spoiled" and thus denied "respect and regard" by
the community. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED
IDENTITY 8-9 (1963). Consequently, they are no longer "like us"-in other words,
"outsiders." As I have written elsewhere, "Outsiders find themselves highly vulnerable
to hardships bred by their civic impoverishment, which include indifference, neglect,
or capriciousness." Robertson, supra at 484. Imprisonment almost invariably imposes
"outsider" membership:
First, the loss of liberty embodies physical removal from the broader community and, sym-
bolically, "represents a deliberate, moral rejection of the criminal by the free community."
In turn, the rules regulating virtually every aspect of daily life deprive one of autonomy and
thus threaten "the prisoner's self-image as a fully accredited member of adult society."
Id. at 484-85(footnotes omitted) (quoting GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF
CAPTIVEs 65, 76 (1958)).
" See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the "scant deliberation"
given the PLRA).
60 Throughout the Congressional Record, Senators Dole Hatch, Kyl, and Reid deni-
grated the legitimacy of inmate litigation by anecdotal accounts of seemingly outland-
ish suits. They retold some alleged abuses, such as an inmate suing over a bad haircut,
again and again. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (state-
ment of Sen. Dole) (containing various anecdotes, including an inmate suing over a
bad haircut), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
OF 1996, supra note 6, at doc. 16; 141 CONG. REc. S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (containing various anecdotes, including, once again, an
inmate suing over a bad haircut), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, at doc. 16; 141 CONG. REC. S14413 (daily ed. Sept.
27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (containing various anecdotes, including an in-
mate suing because of a "defective haircut"), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, at doc. 12. Jim Thomas described this termi-
nology as "[a]ccount-generating rhetoric," which "tends to replace data, and argu-
ments against prisoner suits are packaged in ways that distort rather than illuminate
the nature and processes of prisoner grievances."Jim Thomas, The "Reality" of Prisoner
Litigation: Repackaging the Data, 15 N. ENG.J. CRIM. & Cry. CONFINEMENT 27, 29 (1989).
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"untouchables"6'-to be kept at arm's length from the civil
community. Nor was their exclusion inconsistent with majori-
tarian supremacy. "[T] he ideal of democracy," wrote Morton J.
Horwitz, "came to be understood to have nothing to say about
the protection of minorities. 62
III. FOOTNOTE FOUR: THE LAST REFUGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
"OUTSIDERS?"
Can the majoritarian paradigm adequately protect power-
less, stigmatized groups? 63 Some of their number, such as Afri-
can-Americans, are largely identified and defined by
physiological attributes. Other groups, including inmates, are
socially constructed.
The most influential attempt at reconciling their protection
with majoritarianism came at the height of the New Deal in
United States v. Carolene Products Co.64 The facts of Carolene Prod-
ucts do not bear repeating because the decision is synonymous
JudgeJon 0. Newman found that some of the more highly publicized examples of
frivolous litigation "were at best highly misleading and, sometimes, simply false."
Hon. John 0. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62
BROOKLYN L. REv. 519, 520-27 (1996). The number of truly frivolous inmate suits
amounted to "needles" in "the 'haystacks' of prisoner lawsuits." Id. at 52. Two other
studies reached similar conclusions. After examining filings in Arkansas, Illinois, and
Missouri, Howard Eisenberg concluded that an inmate's notion of "some arbitrary,
irrational, bureaucratic, or dehumanizing" aspect of confinement might appear to a
court as frivolous. Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 438. "What to most people would be a
very insignificant manner becomes, because of he nature of prison life, a matter of
real concern to the inmate." Id. at 438-39. In his study of California filings, Theo-
dore Eisenberg deduced that "most prisoner section 1983 complaints were not plainly
trivial assertions .... Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and An
Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 537 (1982).
" See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial
Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1898 (1999) (describing felons as "the un-
touchable class of American society").
12 Horwitz, supra note 36, at 62.
63 See, e.g., ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 79 (1955):
Judicial power to nullify a law ... is a restriction upon the power of the majority to govern
the country. Unrestricted majority rule leaves the individual in the minority unprotected.
This is the dilemma .... The Constitution-makers made their choice in favor of a limited
majority rule.
See also, e.g., Normal R. Williams III, Note, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian
Theory of Judicial Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 963, 963 (1994) ("The central problem of
democratic government is protecting minorities form the tyranny of the majority. In
drafting the Constitution, the Framers were sensitive to this concern .....
' 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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with its famous footnote four.65 It provided for "more search-
ing" or "more exacting" judicial scrutiny when legislation (1)
endangered specific textual rights; (2) interfered with demo-
cratic processes; or (3) evidenced prejudice against "discrete
and insular minorities."6 Footnote four has become the basis
for "tiered" scrutiny of legislation, with statutory burdens on
fundamental rights or suspect classes6 receiving enhanced ju-
" See, e.g., LIEF H. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ART OF POLIICS 86 (1985) (describing footnote four as "the
most commonly cited justification for . . . active [judicial] protection of civil rights
and liberties"); ELY, supra note 29, at 75 (asserting that footnote four foreshadowed
the groundbreaking decisions of the Warren Court); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene
Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087, 1088 (1982) ("[M]any scholars think it
[i.e., footnote four] actually commenced a new era in constitutional law"); Pamela S.
Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious
Intent, 93 YALE, L.J. 111, 115 (1983) (observing that "[tihe famous ... footnote four
first suggests that the normal presumption of constitutionality may not operate in
cases involving certain distinctions").
66 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment ....
It is unnecessary to consider whether legislation which restricts these political proc-
esses which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment ....
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations into the review of statutes di-
rected at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities: whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a specific condition, which tends seriously to
curtail and operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searchingjudicial inquiry.
" Fundamental rights are those liberties "so rooted in the tradition and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
fundamental rights, thus making them applicable to the states. See, e.g., Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (holding that the right against double jeopardy is
fundamental); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (holding that the
right to travel is fundamental); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968)
(holding that the right to trial by jury is fundamental); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel is fundamental). See gener-
ally U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting, in relevant part, states from "de-
priv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
68 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (ruling that legislation
preventing aliens from receiving welfare benefits contravenes the Equal Protection
Clause); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that school segregation
violates the Equal Protection Clause). The burden falls upon the government to
2001] PLRAJURISPRUDENCE
dicial scrutiny. Strict scrutiny usually invalidates the legislation
in question.69 On the other hand, non-suspect legislative classi-
fications must merely be rational7° and enjoy a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality."
Lower federal courts have uniformly rejected heightened
protection for inmates. Boivin v. Black5 aptly illustrates their
demonstrate that the statute advances a compelling state interest in a narrowly tai-
lored manner. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (uphold-
ing the relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War II); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (permitting restrictions on third trimester abortions); cf
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (articulating the phrase "compelling
interest" for the first time).
69 Strict scrutiny is nearly always "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gun-
ther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). But see
Adarand Contractors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("We wish to dispel the notion
that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
70 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) ("On rational-
basis review, a classification in a statute ... comes to us bearing a strong presumption
of validity.") (citation omitted); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[Llegislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est."); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (observing that ration-
ality review "presume(s] the constitutionality of the statutory discrimination");
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("State legislatures are presumed to
have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their
laws result in some inequity."); cf Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (positing
that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must negate "every con-
ceivable basis which might support" it (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lacke Short Auto
Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973))).
71 See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (ruling that rational-basis review applied
to classifications based on mental retardation); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471
(1977) (concluding that rational-basis review applied to age classification); Massachu-
setts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (holding that rational-
basis review properly determined the constitutionality of age classifications); San An-
tonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973) (ruling that rational-
basis review governed classifications based on wealth).
72 See, e.g., Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2000);
Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1997); Carson v.Johnson, 112 F.3d 818,
821-22 (5th Cir. 1997); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Hampton v.
Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. King, 62 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir.
1995); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 1992); Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d
738, 744 (7th Cir. 1992); Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 1991);
Pryor v. Brennan, 914 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 1990); Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690
(4th Cir. 1989); Morrison v. Davis, 88 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Beck v.
Symington, 972 F. Supp. 532, 536 (D. Ariz. 1997); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318,
1333 (S.D. Ind.), afrd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997); Craig v. Emberly No. 95-M-368,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22949, at *5-7 (D. Colo.July 27, 1997). But cf Robert C. Farrell,
Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1, 56 (1992)
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perfunctory treatment of this issue: the First Circuit dispensed
of the plaintiffs claim to being a member of a suspect class by
the glib rejoinder "[w]e need not linger long over . . . [the in-
mate-plaintiff's] suggestion."74
Nonetheless, Congress enacted the PLRA in the face of fla-
grant wrongs inflicted on inmates. 75  An informal sampling
yields the following: confining an inmate for twenty-three hours
a day in a windowless, unlit cell frequently awash with sewage;
76
subjecting inmates to "... violence, robbery, rape, gambling,
and use of weapons " in open, unsupervised barracks;
"[r] epeatedly stabbing, beating and kicking a prisoner who has
been disarmed and knocked to the ground;"7 refusing to pro-
vide a wheelchair to a paraplegic inmate;79 and failing to provideprotective clothing to inmates working in the prison's sewers. 80
(stating that "the Supreme Court has never explained how to decide which form of
rationality review is appropriate in a particular case.").
7' 225 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2000).
Id. at 42.
See, e.g., KENNETH C. HAAs & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, Introduction, in THE DILEMMAS
OF CORRECTONS 81, 81 (3d ed. 1991):
[A]nyone who reads the evidence accrued in the hundreds of lawsuits brought to the
courts by state prisoners in the past few years can only conclude that all too many Amei-
can prisons-perhaps the majority-are depressing, rat-infested, heavily overcrowded for-
tresses that have created perverse societies in which violence, homosexual rape, and other
assorted cruelties are everyday occurrences.
Since the above observation, we have entered a new century to no avail; the state
of our prisons remains perilous. The sad tale of Texas' prisons is a case-in-point:
The evidence before this court revealed a prison underworld in which rapes, beatings, and
servitude are the currency of power. Inmates who refuse to join race-based gangs may be
physically or sexually assaulted. To preserve their physical safety, some vulnerable inmates
simply subject to being bought and sold among groups of prison predators, providing their
oppressors with commissary goods, domestic services, or sexual favors. The lucky ones are
allowed to pay money for their protection. Other abused inmates find that violating prison
rules, so that they may be locked away in single cells in administrative segregation, is a ra-
tional means of self-protection, despite the loss of good time that comes with their "pun-
ishment." To expect such a world to rehabilitate wrongdoers is absurd. To allow such a
world to exist is unconstitutional.
Ruiz v.Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 916 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
7" See McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991).
77 Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 103 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 1996).
78 Bogan v. Stround, 958 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1992).
" See Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 1993).
'0 SeeFruitv. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1148-49 (8th Cir. 1990).
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Why do these abuses occur in the face of scrutinizing courts
and more than three decades of judicially engineered reforms?8
First, prisons remain "closed institutions8 2 that confine inmates
as well as inhibit outside scrutiny. Second, to many people, in-
mates are unworthy of concern. Finally, their disenfranchise-
ment,s' poverty,ss and pariah statuss6 render them powerless
before the elected branches of government.
87
Several commentators favor extending suspect status to in-
mates. Professor Karlan spoke of inmates as ". . . the least sym-
pathetic group of 'outsiders' in our constitutional
jurisprudence." Similarly, Professor Chemerinsky asserted,
"There are other discrete and insular minorities. I believe that
prisoners, for example, will get no protection from the political
process. They have no political constituency. The only way to
protect prisoners from inhumane treatment is the federal judi-
SI See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 26, at 368 (concluding that "[the prison] reform
cases were an important contribution to three major developments: the emergence of
a national corrections profession, the formulation of national standards for correc-
tions, and the general bureaucratization of prisons."); M. KAY HARRiS & DUDLEY P.
SPILLER, JR., AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OFJUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL
SETTINGS 21 (1977) ("The judicial intervention in each of the correctional law cases
studied had impact that was broad and substantial."); Alvin J. Bronstein, 15 Years of
Prison Litigation, 11 J. NAT'L PRISON PROJECT 1, 6 (Spring 1987) ("Litigation has re-
sulted in profound and permanent changes in the conditions under which tens of
thousands of prisoners must live."); Susan P. Strum, The Legacy and Future of Corrections
Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 670 (1993) (concluding that "court intervention
generally has improved the living conditions and practices in the facilities at issue");
William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in Fed-
eral Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 639 (1979) (observing that "nearly everyone we in-
terviewed believed that the [prisoner] cases had great impact").
82 MICHAEL WELCH, PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 189 (2000) (emphasis omitted).
" See James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change,
and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUSTON L. REv. 1003, 1028 (1997) ("Inmates have joined
the ranks of those persons deemed undeserving of aid, comfort, or compassion.").
84 With the exception of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont, all
states disenfranchise imprisoned felons. See Fletcher, supra note 61, at 1898.
"5 About one-half of inmates free for a year or more before their arrest reported
incomes under $10,000; nineteen percent reported incomes less than $3,000. See
JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON 101-36 (5th ed.
2000).
86 SeeJAMES AUSTIN &JOHN IRWIN, IT'S ABOUT TIME 111 (3d ed. 2001) (describing
inmates as "among society's leading pariahs").
87 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 288
(1993) ("Incarcerated criminal offenders constitute a despised minority without po-
litical power to influence the policies of legislative and executive officials.").
Karlan, supra note 58, at 176.
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ciary."' 9 A student commentator agreed: "While not a suspect
class as traditionally defined, prisoners nonetheless comprise a
politically vulnerable and underrepresented group that must
rely on the courts for protection . . . ."90 Elsewhere, I have ar-
gued that inmates possess attributes strikingly similar to the
"paradigmatic Carolene-group,"9  African-Americans circa 1938.9
Justice Stevens has sided with us. In his dissenting opinion in
Hudson v. Palmer,9' he lamented that "[p]risoners are truly the
outcasts of society. Disenfranchised, scorned and feared . ..,
[and] shut away from public view, prisoners are surely a 'dis-
crete and insular minority."' 94
V. THE PLRA AND THE JUSTICE GAP
New inmates enter a "total institution"9 with little education
or training.96 They are often afflicted with substance abuse 97 and
99 See Transcript, The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism and Judi-
cial Mandates Edited Transcripts from the Panel Discussions Held in Phoenix, Arizona on No-
vember 3rd and 4th, 1995, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 30-31 (1996) (remarks of Erwin
Chemerinsky) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Soci-
ety]; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 441, 449-60 (1999) ("Those in the military, in prisons, and in
schools are classic examples of discrete and insular minorities, who have little politi-
cal power."); cf Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead?: Reflec-
tions on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV.
686, 695-96 (1991) (commenting that "the reference [in footnote four] to 'discrete
and insular minority' [in the third paragraph of footnote four] may refer to groups
other than blacks and religious and national-origin minorities," adding the "lack of
political power may justify heightened judicial solicitude for other groups in the fu-
ture.").
'0 Riewe, supra note 17, at 143.
" Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713, 732 (1985);
see also ELY, supra note 29, at 147 (stating that race is "the clearest case of a classifica-
tion that should count as suspect.").
92 Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, supra note 17, at
124-40 (describing inmates as a largely black subgroup that experiences racial segre-
gation, prejudice, disenfranchisement, and impoverishment); see also, e.g., SMTH, su-
pra note 87, at 288 ("Incarcerated criminal offenders constitute a despised minority
without political power to influence the policies of legislative and executive offi-
cials.").
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
Id. at 557 (1984) (StevensJ, dissenting).
99 ERVINGGOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 6 (1961):
The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of the
barriers separating three spheres of life. First, all aspects of life are conducted in the
same place and under the same single authority. Second, each phase of the mem-
ber's activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of
whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together. Third, all phases
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varying degrees of mental illness. " Already damaged,99 many
inmates experience imprisonment as ". . . a series of abase-
ments, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self."'00
Not surprisingly, many will leave prison further damaged, with
their "outsider" status more deeply engrained. Many will re-
turn. 1' "[Wie are producing prisoners," concluded James Aus-
tin andJohn Irwin, "who have deteriorated in prison and return
to the outside much less well-equipped to live a conventional
life than they were when they entered prison."02 In exchange,
the public accrues few if any benefits: "The universal wisdom is
that our prisons have fallen woefully short in achieving their ob-
jectives-community protection, crime reduction, and offender
rehabilitation. "103
Several lower federal courts have read the Eighth Amend-
ment to forbid prison conditions that foster recidivism' and
of the day's activities are tightly scheduled. Finally, the various enforced activity are
brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official
objectives of the institution.
"6 See U.S. DEP'T OF JusricE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINALJUSTICE STATIsTICs-1994, 551 tbl.6.30 (1995) (indicating that in 1992 the
median education of inmates in 38 states was the eleventh grade).
" See Charles Blanchard, Drugs, Crime, Prison, and Treatment, 34, 34 CORRECTIONS
01/02 (2001) (stating that as many as eighty percent of inmates are afflicted by sub-
stance abuse).
SeeJames R.P. Ogloff et al., Mental Health Services in Jails and Prisons: Legal, Clini-
cal, and Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PYSCHOL. REv. 109, 109 (1994) (citing studies showing
that 6.5%-10% of inmates battle serious mental illness and an additional 15%-40%
confront moderate mental illness).
SeeAUSTIN & IRWIN, supra note 86, at 110.
'0' GoFFMAN, supra note 95, at 14.
... See ALLAN BECK & BERNARD SHIPLEY, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983
tbl.2 (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 1989), available at
http://-ww.ojp.sdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf
'0' See IRWIN & AUSIN, supra note 86, at 110. See also, e.g., Craig Haney, Psychology
and the Limits of Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCH.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 499, 533 (1997) ("Inmates who adjusted most successfully to a prison
environment actually encountered the most difficulty making the transition from in-
stitutional life to freedom."); RobertJohnson & Hans Toch, Introduction, in THE PAINS
OF IMPRISONMENT 11, 11 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1988) ("IT] he prison's
survivors become tougher, more pugnacious, and less able to feel for themselves,
while its nonsurvivors become weaker, more susceptible, and less able to control their
lives.").
"' Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Condi-
tions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REv. 373, 374 (1995).
'a4 See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 403 (10th Cir. 1977); Hendrix v.
Faulkner, 527 F. Supp. 435, 525 (N.D. Ind. 1981); Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122,
131-32 (D. Colo. 1979), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 639 F.2d 559 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1980); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323
206 JAMES E. ROBERTSON [Vol. 92
consequent reimprisonment. At the apex of this case law stands
Laaman v. Helgemoe.'0 5 It ruled that confinement in a New
Hampshire prison inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by
".... cost[ing] a man more than part of his life; it robs him of his
skills, his ability to cope with society in a civilized manner, and
most importantly, his essential human dignity."' ° Justices Bren-
nan and Blackmun later adopted Laaman's concept of cruel and
usual punishment. In his concurring opinion in Rhodes v.
Chapman,'° Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote:
"When 'the cumulative impact of the conditions of incarcera-
tion threatens the physical, mental, and emotional health and
well-being of the inmates and/or creates a probability of recidi-
vism and future incarceration,' the court must conclude that
the conditions violate the Constitution."08
By asserting a crimineogenic relationship between the
prison and the neighborhoods that channel young men into its
walls,1 ° this concept of the Eighth Amendment parts with tradi-
(D.N.H. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), afd as modified
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379(E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
Reading the Eighth Amendment to prohibit prison conditions that perpetuate an
inferior, caste-like social status can be traced to Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910) and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The Weems Court held that punish-
ments grossly disproportionate to the offense inflicted cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Weems, 171 U.S. at 373. In. so ruling, the Court condemned a sanction that
permanently excluded the offender from civil society. See id. at 100 ("He may not
seek, even in other scenes and among other people, to retrieve his fall from rectitude.
Even that hope is taken from him .... No circumstance of degradation is omitted.").
Later, in Trop, the Court again employed the Eighth Amendment to bar denation-
alization. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 103. Its rationale again invoked the evil of exclusion-
ary sanctions: "There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture.
There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society
.... He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people
.... .Id. at 101-02.
105 437 F. Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977).
106 Id. at 323.
117 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
'0' Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.
Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)).
'o' See, e.g., Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, supra
note 17, at 128 (footnotes omitted):
The social construction of criminality presents the chronically unemployed underclass-
the pejorative label for impoverished inner-city residents-as crimineogenic and thus prop-
erly housed in prison. Indeed, the nation's ghettos function as farm clubs for our major
league prisons given the movement of offenders between them. Managing this urban rab-
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tional notions of individual blameworthiness."0 Prisons that fos-
ter recidivism soil the hands of the state and the social system it
protects."' Moreover, they weaken the moral barrier between
ble drives contemporary penal policy toward incapacitating offenders irrespective of their
dangerousness.
See also, e.g., Edward P. Sbarbo & Robert L. Keller, Introduction, in PRISON CRISIS:
CRITICAL READINGS 1, 11 (Edward P. Sbarbo & Robert L. Kerller eds., 1995) (asserting
that the "[slocial junk"-the inner city poor and minorities-form "a dangerous
class," which the criminal justice system seeks to control); cf. Malcolm M. Feeley &
Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on theEmerging Strategy of Corrections and Its
Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 455 (1992):
The term underclass is used today to characterize a segment of society that is viewed as
permanently excluded from social mobility and economic integration. The term is used to
refer to a largely black and Hispanic population living in concentrated zones of poverty in
central cities, separated physically and institutionally from the suburban locus of main-
stream social and economic life in America.
Inmates as a collective are confined for their crimes and their race. See, e.g., Theo-
dore G. Chiricos & Charles Crawford, Race and Imprisonment: A Contextual Assessment of
the Evidence, in ETHicrv, RACE, AND CRIME 281, 297 (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 1995)
(concluding that "race is a consistent and frequently significant disadvantage when..
• [incarceration] decisions are considered."). Blatant, uniform racial discrimination
has been largely replaced by so-called "contextual" discrimination, i.e., disparate
treatment appears in some stages of the criminal justice system in some jurisdictions
for some offenses. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OFJUSTICE 230 (1996)
(arguing that contextual discrimination occurs in that "[r]acial minorities are treated
more harshly than whites at some stages of the criminal justice process but no differ-
ently than whites at other stages."); Margorie S. Zatz, Race, Ethnicity and Determinate
Sentencing, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 147, 147 (1984) ("The sum of our knowledge is that for
some offenses in some jurisdictions . . . some groups are differentially treated.").
Perhaps the manifest disparity appears in the long-running war on drugs: blacks
comprise thirteen percent of monthly drug users, an amount proportionate to their
presence in the population, but account for seventy-four percent of prison sentences
for drug-related offenses. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK MALES AND
THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 12 fig.1 (1995).
Moreover, lack of employment exercises a "significant, strong, and independent
impact" on pretrial and pre-sentencing incarceration decisions. Theodore Chiricos &
William Bales, Unemployment and Punishment: An Empirical Assessment, 29 CRIMINOLOGY
701, 719 (1991); see also Michael Welch, Racial and Social Class in the Examination of
Punishment, inJUSTICE WrrH PREJUDICE 156, 166 (MichaelJ. Lynch & Edwin Patterson
eds., 1996) (reviewing the scholarly literature and concluding that "in the case of im-
prisonment there is a pattern of discrimination against the unemployed that is even
more apparent for minorities processed by the criminal justice system").
"0 Judge Lois G. Forer wrote of "the medieval legacy of the conflation of sin and
punishment." Louis G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH 28 (1994). She asserted that this
legacy rests on the three assumptions, which continue to prevail in popular opinion
and public policy. These assumptions are: "1. Crime is sin; 2. All persons except the
mentally ill must be punished; 3. Sinners must be punished." Id.
" See Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in
Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv.' 111, 121 (2001) (observing that
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the prison and the community: inmates can no longer be re-
garded as "outsiders" when their criminality may arise out of the
manner of their punishment.
Nonetheless, what Lawrence Sager described as the "under-
enforcement" of constitutional norms has blocked this expan-
sive reading of the Eighth Amendment. 112 He contended that
courts sometimes understate "the legal scope of a constitutional
norm" because of institutional considerations-such as defer-
ence.11 3 Consistent with Sager's hypothesis, the Supreme Court
since Bell has repeatedly superimposed deference,14 the hand-
maiden of the majoritarianism, '15 over the dignitary interests ad-
vanced by Laaman"6 and explicitly embraced in Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in Rhodes.17
Through the PLRA, Congress came to the aid of the post-
Bell Supreme Court. While the Act does not directly tread upon
the concept of cruel and unusual punishment, it indirectly con-
trols the reach of the prohibition. By limiting the authority of
the federal judiciary to remedy prison conditions, Congress will
not allow the courts to answers questions of social justice raised
by who we imprison and why we imprison them. Through the
PLRA, Congress sought to ensure "the thinness of constitutional
law" as it applies to inmates."8
"[e]very prison remains intimately connected to the state, incarcerating inmates ar-
rested, prosecuted, and sentenced by the state .... ").
11 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tionalNorms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (1978).
11' Id.
..4 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing Bell's entreaty for def-
erence and subsequent pronouncements to that effect).
... See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing majoritarianism and itsjudicial acknowledgment via deference to legislative and administrative policy mak-
ing).
.. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06 (briefly recounting Laaman's prohibi-
tion of prison conditions fostering recidivism)
17 See supra text accompanying notes 107-08 (briefly recounting Justice Brennan's
adoption of Laaman's concept of cruel and unusual punishment).
"' See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Consti-
tutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 410, 410 (1993):
Constitutional case law is thin in this important sense: the range of those matters that are
plausible candidates for judicial engagement and enforcement in the name of the Consti-
tution is considerably smaller than the range of those matters that are plausible under-
stood to implicate serious questions of political justice. This moral shortfall is one of the
most durable and salient features of our constitutional life.
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Injustices inflicted by government on the most despised
persons especially call for an effective remedy."19  While the
tiered review inspired by Carolene Products ° gives the appear-
ance that the despised and the powerless can secure such a
remedy from the courts, the PLRA suggests that majoritarian
supremacy remains the final arbiter in such matters.'2 ' Because
of the PLRA, protecting the most vulnerable of "outsiders"-
those who are stigmatized, powerless, and confined to "total
institutions, "-will remain an enigma to a constitutional system
whose grundnorm12 is majority status.
V. CONCLUSION
Majoritarian supremacy represents an exclusionary concept
at odds with the pluralism, diversity, and conflict that both in-
vigorates and divides the body politic. By deferring to legislative
judgments, federal courts have acquiesced to majoritarian su-
premacy in matters of consequence for inmates. Given the fre-
quent lapses of the body politic in providing humane conditions
of confinement, future generations may indeed judge our
courts poorly for failing to exercise their full judicial author-
ity.
123
"9 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 237, 254 (1978) ("Rights ... do not exist in a vac-
uum. Their purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests .... ");
see also Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1434 (1972) ("Once substantive legal norms have been declared
to be in the Constitution, there is much to be said for ajudicial prerogative to fashion
remedies that give flesh to the word and a fulfillment to the promise those norms
embody.").
120 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (examining the heightened scru-
tiny mandated by footnote four of Carolene Products).
"' Several commentators question the utility of footnote four. See, e.g., Ackerman,
supra note 91, at 717 ("A reappraisal of Carolene is a pressing necessity .... "; Geoffrey
Miller, The True Stoy of Carolene Products, in 1987 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 397, 428
(Philip B. Kurland et. al. eds., 1988) ("The political theory underlying the Carolene
Products footnote needs to be updated."); Lawrence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1073 (1980) (implying that
footnote four is "radically indeterminate and fundamentally incomplete").
'2 A "grundnorm" is "the basic norm" of a legal system. David Dyzenhaus, "How
the Machine Runs Itsef" Carl Schmitt on Hobbes and Kelsen, 16 CARDOzO L. REv. 1, 10
(1994).
"3 Cf Chemerinsky, The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society, supra note 89, at 70
("Virtually all judicial protection of individual liberties involves at least some degree
of value selection by unelected judges."); Wociech Sadurski, Conventional Morality and
Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REV. 339, 397 (1987) (observing that judicial decision-
making invariably requires judges to come to a moral Rubicon-to make moral
choices or to abdicate).
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